The Bohemian
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Getting it right in the transfer market is a critical factor in determining how successful a football club is.
From the Premier League relegation season in 2006-2007 to the present day, Sheffield United signed over 175 players (through a combination of 63 loan and 112 permanent deals) and sold or released 125 – all overseen by 9 different Managers (excluding Caretakers).
Of the 112 permanent signings, by my estimation and with the input of other forum members, only 16 (less than 15%), can be convincingly argued as ‘successful.’ My criteria for success is partly subjective and based on assessing the player against the following criteria:
- made at least 25 first team appearances
- positively impacted team performance
- held or increased his market value
“Market value” is flagged up as relevant but is an uncertain factor, at present, due to many transfers being registered as “undisclosed.”
My list is as follows:
Rob Hulse
Colin Kazim-Richards
Matt Kilgallon
Jon Stead
James Beattie (first time)
Gary Speed
Ugo Ehiogu
Jamie Ward
Lee Williamson
Lescinel Jean-Francois
Kevin McDonald
Nick Blackman
Jamie Murphy
Chris Basham
Che Adams
Billy Sharp (third time)
Implicit in my analysis is an assumption that the Manager had the final say on identifying players for incoming transfer activity, though I have made note of the Chief Executive who was working alongside each Manager.
2006-07: Warnock and Robinson
Warnock’s alleged failure in the transfer market prior to and during the 2006-07 Premier League season is often mooted as a key factor in our subsequent relegation. I’m not so sure this stacks up.
Hulse, Kazim-Richards, Kilgallon and Stead were astute, value for money, signings who all performed well and improved the team. Had Hulse not sustained his career-threatening injury at Chelsea in March 2007, his goals would almost certainly have kept us up. Kilgallon went on to form an excellent partnership with Morgan and proved difficult to replace; Kazim-Richards cost a paltry £150k yet made an instant impact in the Premier League and was sold on for a handsome profit, and Stead was, well…………. steady!
Leigertwood, another Warnock signing, was never popular with a rump of supporters, despite his excellent work rate. He was signed for £600k, played two thirds of the season and was sold on for £900k to QPR, for whom he went on to play a load more games for in the Premier League. We’d had far worse than Leigertwood before and experienced far, far worse since!
Warnock’s worst signings were, arguably, his most expensive: Claude Davis – who Warnock described as “a Rolls Royce” but performed more like a Hillman Imp – and Luton Shelton, who was lightning fast but just not very good a football.
Like all managers, Warnock made some errors in the transfer market and perhaps he was simply more experienced and adept at shopping in Aldi than Waitrose?
2007-08: Robson, Blackwell and Robinson
With Warnock gone and The Blades desperate to get back up at the first attempt, Kevin McCabe was ready to ‘splash the cash’ and appointed Bryan Robson to oversee the reshaping of the squad.
Many supporters subsequently lambasted Robson for wasting millions and setting the club back many years. Some or all of that may be true but he signed some good players. Beattie, Naysmith, Ehiogu and Speed joined on permanent deals and his loan signings included Gary Cahill, and Phil Bardsley. Hardly a disastrous record!
His permanent deals were expensive and he failed to get the best out of his team, but he did sign good players – better than we had at the time and generally far better than we’ve experienced since.
2008-09: Blackwell and Robinson
It was under Blackwell’s reign that the transfer market wheels really came off. Jamie Ward was his one permanent signing in his first full season, who could confidently be assessed as successful. He also made a couple of decent loan acquisitions, during the season, in Greg Halford and Nathan Dyer.
However, these small islands of success were swamped by a tsunami of expensive flops in the likes of Henderson, Howard and Sun Jihai, supplemented by loan liabilities such as Craig Beattie, Arturo Lupoli and Antony Stokes.
This was the year of the Play-off final defeat to Burnley when, having sold ‘good Beattie’ in January, we turned up at Wembley with a strike force consisting of ‘bad Beattie’ and, erm, no one else!
2009-10: Blackwell and Birch
Blackwell ‘s dealings continued to weaken the team over the 2009-10 season with Lee Williamson his only plausible argument for a successful signing. Ched Evans was signed for £3m during the close season but failed to deliver under Blackwell, scoring only 4 goals in 36 appearances in 2009/10 and a similar return the following season before eventually finding his form under Wilson after relegation to the 3rd division.
Others to arrive prior to and during the season included Ryan France, Jordan Stewart, Andy Taylor and James Harper – all of whom failed to make a positive impact on team performance.
His loan signings were even less inspiring with Andrew Davies, Marcus Seip and Tony Kallo brought at various stages to fortify Blackwell’s stuttering squad.
Kyles Naughton and Walker were flogged to Spurs in July 09 for a reported, combined, fee of £9m. Most of this was supposedly allocated to Naughton – which looked like good business – with the remainder towards the prodigiously unexposed Walker. The Walker sale made much less sense in the context of trying to mount another serious promotion challenge., especially as the player appeared in no hurry to leave.
2010-11: Blackwell (followed by Speed and Adams) and Birch
The 2010 close season got off to a dismal start when Paddy Kenny repaid the generous support received from The Blades, during his drug-induced sabbatical, by triggering his outrageously under-valued release clause and scampering off to his surrogate Dad, Warnock - newly ensconced as QPR boss.
It was hard to believe that Blackwell could get things even more badly wrong in his 2010 close season dealings – but he did!
His major signings were Ertl from Palace. Leon Britton - out of contract at Swansea, but likely to have cost a fortune in salary and signing on fee - and Daniel Bogdanovich who had been doing well at Barnsley and would not have come cheap.
Bogdanovich and Ertl were consistently ordinary or worse. Britton on the other hand was clearly a good player but must have been thoroughly confused, having been signed as a playmaker in a team, which was pre-ordained to kick the ball over his head. He was the metaphorical “fish out of water“ and must have become even more disorientated when ‘Blackie’ decided he could fix the problem of Leon not receiving the ball from his defence by pushing him further up field into the Number 10 role. He departed soon after.
Blackwell’s record in the transfer market was nothing short of disastrous. Of approximately 30 permanent signings made during his tenure, only two – Lee Williamson and Jamie Ward– could be convincingly argued as successful. The rest were a mixture of average, mediocre and ill conceived.
Gary Speed was left to pick up the pieces of the disjointed squad bequeathed by Blackwell and cope with the catastrophic loss of Morgs due to a cruciate injury sustained in November 2010. With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that The Blades’ relegation fate was sealed at that moment.
Taking over ‘between windows’, Speed had limited opportunity to demonstrate his market prowess but he still brought in Andy Reid on loan from Sunderland , thus demonstrating the ability to sign someone who improved the team – a concept which seemed generally beyond Blackwell.
Speed had been around long enough to know he’d inherited a shambles of a squad and when Wales came knocking in December 2010, he didn’t take too long to answer.
Next up was Micky Adams who needed a good January 2011 ‘window’ to stave off the looming threat of relegation. His team lacked goals, with Evans still not firing and Bogdanovich looking increasingly disinterested. He also had a major problem in central defence with Bartley (willing but raw), Nosworthy (error prone) and Ertl (jumped lower than he stood) failing to plug the gap left by Morgan.
In came Doyle, Collins and Shane Lowry to shore things up, with Sam Vokes joining on loan in February. Vokes provided a modicum of hope but overall any improvement achieved was minimal and The Blades were effectively relegated by April 2011.
A staggering 29 signings (15 permanent and 14 loan) were made before and during the 2010-11 season. This was mismanagement on a grand scale with countless millions burnt on wages to incompetent players, loan fees, agent payments and paying off failing managers. This was the season, which epitomised everything The Blades’ had got wrong since relegation from The Premier League.
2011-12: Wilson and Winter
Relegation to the Third Division meant Adams was gone and in, amidst huge controversy, came Danny Wilson and his assistant Frank Barlow.
Another swathe of expensive failures left during the close season, including Henderson, Bogdanovich and Yeates. Jordan Slew was sold to Blackburn for £1m after only a handful of first team appearances (many supporters saw this as good business) and Jamie Ward left for an “undisclosed” fee to Derby.
Wilson’s first close season dealings look retrospectively positive. In came Kevin McDonald, Lescinel Jean-Francois, Ryan Flynn and Chris Porter. McDonald instantly looked too good for League One and LJF made a strong early impression, providing an attacking element from the left side of defence which had been lacking since Naughton’s departure.
Wilson’s January 2012 window was much less convincing with James Beattie’s return proving popular but ultimately ineffective and Marcus Williams - signed as left back cover after a half-decent loan spell - particularly disappointing.
Mark Howard was brought in to provide competition for Simonsen, who was proving much less of a liability behind a solid defence, which rendered him a spectator for much of the season.
Wilson’s loan signings were a mixed bag of quality. Billy Clarke and Matt Phillips arrived from Blackpool and added some much-needed attacking menace during the winter months. Phillips in particular looked an exciting prospect.
Less impressive were Hoskins, Egan, Hill and O’Halloran, though Hill was later ‘rewarded’ with a permanent deal.
Wilson had inherited a dysfunctional squad, which included a few good players, in the likes of Lowton, Quinn, Williamson and Maguire. His recruitment of McDonald and LJF, together with the rejuvenation of Evans turned things around and The Blades looked a shoe-in for promotion in 2012 until the unthinkable happened, Evans was gone and we failed to win any of our remaining three games.
2012-13: Wilson
The 2013 close season saw a major restructuring within the playing squad, with McCabe looking to reduce the club’s towering losses and adjust to the realities of an extended stay in the 3rd division.
Most of the biggest earners, including Williamson, Beattie, Quinn, Montgomery, Lowton and Ertl, were culled and Wilson had to search for cheaper replacements.
Seven players were signed during the summer including Shaun Miller, Dave Kitson and Nick Blackman who replaced some of the attacking verve lost with Evans’ departure. Tony McMahon also joined from Middlesboro and his signing was seen as something of a coup at the time – much less so by the time of his departure on loan to Blackpool, 18 months later.
To Wilson’s credit, he dealt with the disaster of missing promotion and loss of most of his key players from the 2011-12 season with some astute signings and an adjustment in playing style from ‘free-scoring’ to ‘hard to beat’. By Christmas 2012 The Blades were top of the league and looking well set to put right the disappointment of the previous campaign. Then catastrophe!
Blackman was sold on 30 January. His replacement, signed earlier in the month, was Jamie Murphy, who would eventually prove to be another excellent acquisition from Wilson’s watch, but despite showing glimpses of quality, he took a long time to adjust to the heightened demands of the English game.
Danny Higginbotham and Barry Robson - Wilson’s other January 2013 signings - rarely looked anything more than journeymen seeing out their time and the season’s early promise steadily faded.
Wilson’s sacking, with only 3 games to play and The Blades sitting comfortably in the play-off places, was nevertheless a shock to most supporters.
Caretaker boss Morgan failed to spark the hoped for response to drive The Blades up through the Play-offs and another season in the third tier was confirmed.
Wilson’s transfer market record looks pretty impressive with the benefit of hindsight and in the cost-saving context he was operating in during the second half of his tenure. In McDonald, Blackman and Murphy he signed 3 players who improved the team significantly and were subsequently sold on at a handsome profit.
2013-14: Weir (followed by Clough) and Winter (followed by Brannigan)
The Blades took a leap into the dark in appointing untested David Weir as their new manager in the summer of 2013.
With midfield lynchpin McDonald (sold to Wolves) amongst ten summer departures, Weir had some rebuilding to do and made 8 signings during the summer of 2013.
His emphasis was clearly on youth, with the likes of Jasper Johns, Febian Brandy, Sean McGinty, Jose Baxter, Florent Cuvelier, Steve McGinn and Lyle Taylor joining.
Despite some early promise, with his team struggling to score, Weir brought in Marlon King on a season-long deal just before the end of the September window. King’s previous off field ‘form’ made him another controversial signings, more so given the negative publicity surrounding Ched Evans.
Baxter was clearly talented but difficult to accommodate given his defensive limitations, whilst Cuvelier came highly rated but was inconsistent and sustained a cruciate injury in January 2014, which impeded his subsequent progress. King looked unfit and diminished, and none of Weir’s other permanent signings did much to inspire confidence that he understood the qualities required to get The Blades promoted from the 3rd division.
Weir did make one outstanding loan signing – that of Conor Coady from Liverpool, who grew in stature as the season progressed and would have been a hugely popular permanent signing.
By the time of his sacking after just 13 games, Weir had overseen the signing of 12 players. Nine of these (McGinty, Johns, McGinn, Taylor, Brandy, King, Bunn, Hall and Lappin) made a negligible contribution to improving the first team’s performance levels; Of the remainder: Baxter could be argued as having had a measure of on-field impact but his off-field ‘issues’ consign him to the status of a ‘bad signing’; the jury remains out on Cuvelier, and only Coady could be regarded as a success.
A legacy of misfits, has-beens and never has-beens is the not so hidden cost of getting it badly wrong in the appointment of a Manager. Weir’s successor was faced with the prospect of a relegation battle with a squad that was simply unfit for purpose.
Nigel Clough made an inauspicious start with his first signing as the new manager with Aiden White joining on loan from Leeds.
He really got down to business in the January 2014 window with the signings of Scougall and Harris on permanent deals along with Brayford, Paynter, Davies and Freeman on loan. Meanwhile, he moved King, McMahon, Barry and Williams out. A strong first ‘window’, many would argue.
Loanees, White and Paynter contributed minimally but Clough’s other signings helped propel The Blades to an FA Cup semi-final and from third bottom, when Clough joined, to the edge of the Play-offs.
2014-15: Clough and Brannigan
Clough’s reshaping began in earnest in the 2014 close season, with 11 players joining on permanent deals and an equal number leaving.
Arrivals included Campbell-Ryce, McNulty, Basham, Wallace J, Alcock, McGahey, Higdon and McEveley. He also offered a permanent deal to loanee Ben Davies and brought in centre half Andy Butler from Walsall.
Of the departures, all bar one were predictable and inconsequential to team performance.
Harry Maguire was sold on 29 July, 2014, for a reported £2.5m to Hull. His replacement, Andy Butler, made not a single league appearance for The Blades, appearing only in a few pre-season games and a League Cup tie against Mansfield before being shipped out on loan back to his former club.
The gap left by Maguire’s departure was threatening to derail The Blades’ promotion bid and Clough acted by bringing in Paddy McCarthy, on loan from Palace. He proved error prone and was eventually dropped. Meanwhile, Clough had fallen out with and marginalised Neill Collins, leaving him with only, youngsters, McGahey and Kennedy as recognised centre-halves.
Kennedy was injury prone and McGahey unready, so Clough, instead, relied on Basham – bought as a midfielder – and Brayford - his talismanic, marauding right-back - to fill in at centre half.
Clough’s January 2015 window could and should have been regarded as a “game-changer” given the arrival of Brayford, Done, Coutts, Adams, Wallace K, Freeman and Holt (on loan). With Butler, Ironside, McGinn and Porter moving out, very few would argue that these transactions were not representative of an improvement in personnel. Staggeringly, Clough undermined his other moves by failing to resolve the problem that was blighting his season – a replacement for Maguire!
Based on a review of the players inherited by Clough and those he subsequently signed and released, the suggestion that he weakened the squad and burdened his successor with “a load of dross” seems insubstantial.
Of his 19 permanent signings, an argument can be made for Basham, Adams and Brayford (under Clough) being successful, whilst most supporters would probably view Butler, Wallace J and Higdon as unsuccessful (Butler and Wallace based on injuries and circumstance rather than ability). For the remainder, the jury is either still out (e.g. McGahey) or it could be argued their impact has been neither disastrous nor outstanding.
Clough frequently underscored his perspective on signing players with a statement along the lines of, “we’ll only sign them if they are better than what we’ve got.” In general terms he probably did this. A strong case can be made that he strengthened the team that he inherited and replaced players he released or sold with others of a higher calibre – with the notable exception of Maguire. Obviously, the issue of cost becomes a factor here and on this point we are left to estimate due to the complications of “undisclosed” transfer payments, signing on fees, individual contracts etc.
It nevertheless seems reasonable to assume that Clough spent big and was still unable to achieve the increasingly elusive promotion back to The Championship.
Clough failed in three key areas of transfer policy:
1. His team became imbalanced and over-reliant on smaller, physically weaker midfield players (Scougall, Campbell-Ryce, Holt, Reed, Flynn) which allowed – often less technically proficient – opponents to bully his team into submission.
2. He needed to sign an effective, mobile striker (one who could play the lone role) in the summer of 2014 and signed Higdon instead. Whilst we can all acknowledge the difficulty in signing good strikers, surely he could have, at the very least, signed one with the mobility to work within his preferred system. Matt Done demonstrated this point, making an instant impact after signing in January.
3. He never resolved the loss of Maguire and thereby lost his team’s resilience and ability to soak up pressure and play on the break. In Clough’s second season The Blades were often chasing games and didn’t have the personnel or system to do this (Warnock had been a master in such situations because he ensured he had a variety of attacking options on the bench).
Despite his mistakes, Clough left a squad that had proved its ability to compete at the upper end of League One and was surely only a two or three astute additions short of being promotion ready.
2015-16: Adkins and ?
With relatively few players leaving in the summer of 2015 and a large current squad, new Manager Adkins had limited room for manoeuvre in his first transfer window. Only three permanent signings were made before the first game: Billy Sharp, Martyn Woolford and youngster, Jake Phillips., supplemented by loan signing Conor Sammon
Surprisingly, Adkins chose not to prioritise central defence, relying instead on Collins and McEveley to start the season. With Freeman and McFadzean filling the full back berths, this was a defence designed to concede goals, which it duly did – four of them at Gillingham. At this point, the penny dropped and David Edgar was signed on a season loan from Burnley.
The Gillingham game also proved to be the final game for Jamie Murphy, who was sold to Brighton shortly after. Murphy had been, consistently, one of The Blades’ few outstanding performers over the previous two seasons and his departure looked, on the face of it, like the next in line of season-defining departures, following on from Blackman and Maguire.
Adkins’ signings have, to date, been inconspicuous, with the notable exception of Billy Sharp who has played every game as though it was his last and tried valiantly to lead from the front.
Of the others, Hammond gives the team shape, balance and some physicality, but is often chasing the tails of younger, quicker opponents and at what cost? Edgar has started to impress of late and holds some promise. Woolford looks another in the long line fitting the description of “journeyman pro” to grace our hallowed turf in recent years. Sammon has been nothing short of an abject failure.
Hitherto, Adkins has followed the well, worn route of focusing mainly on players he knows from past clubs and believes he can rely on to deliver to a consistently high standard. The weakness in this approach, given his recent experience of managing at a higher level, could be the cost of these acquisitions and their readiness and desire to scrap their way out of the 3rd division.
Conclusions
Following relegation in 2007, The Blades have signed over 90 players on permanent deals and a further 60 on loan, at considerable expense. Many others have left – some for millions of pounds. The net effect of these comings and goings has been a failure to achieve the objective of returning to the Premier League, indeed a further relegation was suffered in 2011. So what went wrong?
Signing football players is not an exact science. Sometimes good players will underperform for a variety of reasons – often but not always attributable to managers and systems, e.g. Britton under Blackwell. On other occasions players will over perform, based on their previous record, - often due to managers and systems, e.g. Agana under Bassett and beside Deane.
Good managers surely start with a clear plan of how they want to play and sign players who fit with that plan, within the constraints of a budget. The tighter the budget, the harder a manager has to work and many have to work with the reality of selling their best players in order to stay afloat.
Bassett and Warnock had a clear, uncomplicated way of playing and recruited players to suit. Players who’d generally been plying their trade at a lower level or fallen out of favour at their previous club and had a point to prove
Blackwell, by contrast, seemed to apply a scattergun approach to signing players, some of whom did not fit with his preferred, direct style of play. Consequently, his signing of players such as James Harper and Leon Britton who liked to ‘get the ball down and play’ was destined to fail.
Robson was brought in to attract better quality players and ensure a swift return to the Premier League. He got the first part right, attracting the likes of Beattie, Speed and Naysmith, but was unable to translate top players into winning performances (perhaps another example of the inherent problem of catching players on their way down?).
Armed with what looked like a modest Premier League budget, Warnock made some astute signings and was ridiculously close to achieving his sole mission of staying up.
Having missed out on promotion in appalling circumstances in 2011 and having to deal with a reduced budget, Wilson re-gathered his troops and looked set to go close again in 2012 prior to losing his top scorer and assister, Blackman, in the January transfer window.
Which leads us onto the impact of signing or losing one key player.
In the summer of 2010, Paddy Kenny’s trigger clause and ultimate betrayal left us reliant on the talents of Steve Simonsen between the sticks. A weak keeper means a nervy defence and this was a season in which The Blades’ defence was always on the back foot. Once Morgs was lost to the cause the die was cast for what looked and felt like a relegation season.
In much the same way, 2012 felt like a promotion season until Evans’ incarceration scuttled The Blades with the finishing line in sight.
Most controversially, James Beattie was sold to Stoke City in the January 2009 ‘window’ and his goals played a huge part in preserving their Premier League status, which remains to this day. Whilst The Blades’ league position actually improved after Beattie’s departure, it is difficult to argue cause and effect in this instance and completely foolhardy to believe we would not have been better served at Wembley with James leading the line rather than his namesake Craig.
There seems plenty of evidence to suggest that one great signing or ill-timed departure can have a seismic impact on a team’s performance and fortunes.
Kevin McCabe’s point about managers being given “too much money”, sometimes being a problem in itself, is worth pondering. Would Clough have signed as many similar type players given a smaller budget? Would Wilson have signed Murphy had he been armed with a bigger budget at the time? Would Adkins have been forced to trawl for the best youngsters of the lower leagues rather than older players on Premier League and Championship wages if he’d been further constrained? Was Warnock really effective when spending into the millions on a single player?
Based on our success stories there is certainly no guarantee that size of transfer fee necessarily equates to getting it right in the transfer market. Indeed, two of The Blades’ club record – and arguably worst - signings were Chris Guthrie (£100k) in the seventies and Claude Davis (£3m) signed by Warnock.
Transfer fees paid for our successes over the past ten years are estimated as follows:
FREE: Ehiogu, LJF, McDonald and Basham
£0 up to £250k: Kazim-Richards, Blackman, Speed, Murphy and Adams
£250k-£500k: Ward, Williamson and Sharp (3rd time)
£500k-£1m: Stead
£1m+: Hulse, Kilgallon and Beattie
Using the generous assessment of sixteen successful, permanent signings over the past ten years: four were brought in on free transfers with a further five costing £250k or less. Of these McDonald, Kazim-Richards, Blackman and Murphy were sold on at a substantial profit (we can probably assume Adams will follow suit unless promotion is achieved this season or next).
A further four players cost between £250k-£1m, of whom just Jamie Ward is assumed to have been sold on for a profit, and three cost £1m+ - all of them being moved on at a substantial loss.
In Sheffield United’s terms, a transfer fee in excess of £1m can be regarded as ‘spending big’. By my reckoning The Blades have breached this threshold on nine occasions, when buying: Davis, Hulse, KIlgallon, Shelton, Beattie, Naysmith, Henderson, Evans and Brayford. Three of these have made it into our ‘success” list, which, in percentage terms, is better than the overall rate – though it wouldn’t seem unreasonable to expect a greater success rate when spending into the millions.
Of the £1m+ signings, none were sold on at a profit – even the ones adjudged to have been successful (injury was clearly a factor in Rob Hulse’s sell-on value and Kilgallon left on a Bosman).
Indeed, in ‘value for money’ terms, it would appear that The Blades have been far more successful when scouring for bargains. Twelve of the sixteen players, adjudged as “successful” signings, were either signed on a FREE or cost no more than £500k.
Another noteworthy point is that three of the four on our success list, who cost upwards of £500k, were strikers.
The age of our “successful” players at the time of signing ranges from 18 (Che Adams) to 38 (Gary Speed). Closer scrutiny reveals that ten of sixteen were aged 25 or under.
Just five players, from our success list were sold on at a profit. All were aged 23 or under at the time of signing for The Blades (Matt Kilgallon would probably have been added to that list had he not left on a Bosman at the end of his contract). Three of the five (Blackman, Murphy and McDonald) were signed for modest fees during Danny Wilson’s reign.
Another point worthy of consideration, is that over our ten year assessment period, from the 2006-07 season to present, twelve players have risen through The Blades Academy, who could reasonably be regarded as “successful.” These are:
Kyle Walker: 2 appearances, sold for £3m
Kyle Naughton: 40 appearances, sold for £6m
Phil Jagielka: 257 appearances, sold for £4m
Nick Montgomery: 351 appearances
Harry Maguire: 134 appearances, sold for £2.5m
Stephen Quinn: 206 appearances, sold for £100k
Michael Tonge: 262 appearances, sold for £2m
Jordan Slew: 11 appearances, sold for £1.1m
Louis Reed: 54 appearances, current first team squad
George Long: 107 appearances, current first team squad
Billy Sharp: 2 appearances, sold for £100k (then re-signed, sold and re-signed)
That’s 1426 appearances at an average of 118 first team appearances per player, which increases to 157 if we take out Walker, Slew and Sharp who were sold after making 15 just appearances between them.
Transfer receipts from the Academy players, amounts to approximately £18.6m. To put this in perspective, this is only 7% less than £19.9m estimated as the transfer receipts from all non-Academy players over the same, ten year, period.
Estimated transfer spend during the same period is just over £28m. This constitutes a n estimated loss on transfer activity of around £8m, before taking agents fees and other add-ons into account. If the cost of running the Academy has cost, as rumoured, around £1m per annum over the past 10 years, this would suggest a profit of around £8m on Academy transactions. This is before we take the relative wages of Academy versus non-Academy players into account, which we would expect to be significantly lower.
Add in the average number of appearances achieved by our list of successful Academy players (118) versus those on our “successful” list of non-Academy players (53) and the value of The Blades’ development programme becomes ever clearer.
In summary, the past 10 years of transfer activity, borne at considerable expense, has failed to deliver the expected improvement in team performance.
The most successful signings (based on appearances, impact and sell-on value) have been younger players signed from smaller or lower league clubs (Kazim-Richards, Ward, Murphy and Adams (est. value)) or who were out of favour at their previous club (McDonald and Blackman). Interestingly, all of the above bar maybe McDonald – who certainly wasn’t slow - could be described as “quick.”
Older players such as Speed and Ehiogu have shown that age is no barrier to making a positive impact, albeit for a limited period.
Spending larger amounts can improve the likelihood of success, as Beattie, Hulse and Kilgallon demonstrated, but it is certainly no guarantee, as experienced with Davis, Shelton and Henderson.
Having a ‘manager with a plan’ in place is a pre-requisite for success in the transfer market. This means identifying a preferred style of play and recruiting players to suit, as was generally the case with Bassett and Warnock but much less so with Blackwell.
As our analysis of Academy player shows, an effective player development programme can offer outstanding, relative value for money by comparison with recruiting via the transfer market.
Recruiting the right players, whether at Academy or senior level is, of course, but one element of a successful football club. It is, however, a very important one.
From the Premier League relegation season in 2006-2007 to the present day, Sheffield United signed over 175 players (through a combination of 63 loan and 112 permanent deals) and sold or released 125 – all overseen by 9 different Managers (excluding Caretakers).
Of the 112 permanent signings, by my estimation and with the input of other forum members, only 16 (less than 15%), can be convincingly argued as ‘successful.’ My criteria for success is partly subjective and based on assessing the player against the following criteria:
- made at least 25 first team appearances
- positively impacted team performance
- held or increased his market value
“Market value” is flagged up as relevant but is an uncertain factor, at present, due to many transfers being registered as “undisclosed.”
My list is as follows:
Rob Hulse
Colin Kazim-Richards
Matt Kilgallon
Jon Stead
James Beattie (first time)
Gary Speed
Ugo Ehiogu
Jamie Ward
Lee Williamson
Lescinel Jean-Francois
Kevin McDonald
Nick Blackman
Jamie Murphy
Chris Basham
Che Adams
Billy Sharp (third time)
Implicit in my analysis is an assumption that the Manager had the final say on identifying players for incoming transfer activity, though I have made note of the Chief Executive who was working alongside each Manager.
2006-07: Warnock and Robinson
Warnock’s alleged failure in the transfer market prior to and during the 2006-07 Premier League season is often mooted as a key factor in our subsequent relegation. I’m not so sure this stacks up.
Hulse, Kazim-Richards, Kilgallon and Stead were astute, value for money, signings who all performed well and improved the team. Had Hulse not sustained his career-threatening injury at Chelsea in March 2007, his goals would almost certainly have kept us up. Kilgallon went on to form an excellent partnership with Morgan and proved difficult to replace; Kazim-Richards cost a paltry £150k yet made an instant impact in the Premier League and was sold on for a handsome profit, and Stead was, well…………. steady!
Leigertwood, another Warnock signing, was never popular with a rump of supporters, despite his excellent work rate. He was signed for £600k, played two thirds of the season and was sold on for £900k to QPR, for whom he went on to play a load more games for in the Premier League. We’d had far worse than Leigertwood before and experienced far, far worse since!
Warnock’s worst signings were, arguably, his most expensive: Claude Davis – who Warnock described as “a Rolls Royce” but performed more like a Hillman Imp – and Luton Shelton, who was lightning fast but just not very good a football.
Like all managers, Warnock made some errors in the transfer market and perhaps he was simply more experienced and adept at shopping in Aldi than Waitrose?
2007-08: Robson, Blackwell and Robinson
With Warnock gone and The Blades desperate to get back up at the first attempt, Kevin McCabe was ready to ‘splash the cash’ and appointed Bryan Robson to oversee the reshaping of the squad.
Many supporters subsequently lambasted Robson for wasting millions and setting the club back many years. Some or all of that may be true but he signed some good players. Beattie, Naysmith, Ehiogu and Speed joined on permanent deals and his loan signings included Gary Cahill, and Phil Bardsley. Hardly a disastrous record!
His permanent deals were expensive and he failed to get the best out of his team, but he did sign good players – better than we had at the time and generally far better than we’ve experienced since.
2008-09: Blackwell and Robinson
It was under Blackwell’s reign that the transfer market wheels really came off. Jamie Ward was his one permanent signing in his first full season, who could confidently be assessed as successful. He also made a couple of decent loan acquisitions, during the season, in Greg Halford and Nathan Dyer.
However, these small islands of success were swamped by a tsunami of expensive flops in the likes of Henderson, Howard and Sun Jihai, supplemented by loan liabilities such as Craig Beattie, Arturo Lupoli and Antony Stokes.
This was the year of the Play-off final defeat to Burnley when, having sold ‘good Beattie’ in January, we turned up at Wembley with a strike force consisting of ‘bad Beattie’ and, erm, no one else!
2009-10: Blackwell and Birch
Blackwell ‘s dealings continued to weaken the team over the 2009-10 season with Lee Williamson his only plausible argument for a successful signing. Ched Evans was signed for £3m during the close season but failed to deliver under Blackwell, scoring only 4 goals in 36 appearances in 2009/10 and a similar return the following season before eventually finding his form under Wilson after relegation to the 3rd division.
Others to arrive prior to and during the season included Ryan France, Jordan Stewart, Andy Taylor and James Harper – all of whom failed to make a positive impact on team performance.
His loan signings were even less inspiring with Andrew Davies, Marcus Seip and Tony Kallo brought at various stages to fortify Blackwell’s stuttering squad.
Kyles Naughton and Walker were flogged to Spurs in July 09 for a reported, combined, fee of £9m. Most of this was supposedly allocated to Naughton – which looked like good business – with the remainder towards the prodigiously unexposed Walker. The Walker sale made much less sense in the context of trying to mount another serious promotion challenge., especially as the player appeared in no hurry to leave.
2010-11: Blackwell (followed by Speed and Adams) and Birch
The 2010 close season got off to a dismal start when Paddy Kenny repaid the generous support received from The Blades, during his drug-induced sabbatical, by triggering his outrageously under-valued release clause and scampering off to his surrogate Dad, Warnock - newly ensconced as QPR boss.
It was hard to believe that Blackwell could get things even more badly wrong in his 2010 close season dealings – but he did!
His major signings were Ertl from Palace. Leon Britton - out of contract at Swansea, but likely to have cost a fortune in salary and signing on fee - and Daniel Bogdanovich who had been doing well at Barnsley and would not have come cheap.
Bogdanovich and Ertl were consistently ordinary or worse. Britton on the other hand was clearly a good player but must have been thoroughly confused, having been signed as a playmaker in a team, which was pre-ordained to kick the ball over his head. He was the metaphorical “fish out of water“ and must have become even more disorientated when ‘Blackie’ decided he could fix the problem of Leon not receiving the ball from his defence by pushing him further up field into the Number 10 role. He departed soon after.
Blackwell’s record in the transfer market was nothing short of disastrous. Of approximately 30 permanent signings made during his tenure, only two – Lee Williamson and Jamie Ward– could be convincingly argued as successful. The rest were a mixture of average, mediocre and ill conceived.
Gary Speed was left to pick up the pieces of the disjointed squad bequeathed by Blackwell and cope with the catastrophic loss of Morgs due to a cruciate injury sustained in November 2010. With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that The Blades’ relegation fate was sealed at that moment.
Taking over ‘between windows’, Speed had limited opportunity to demonstrate his market prowess but he still brought in Andy Reid on loan from Sunderland , thus demonstrating the ability to sign someone who improved the team – a concept which seemed generally beyond Blackwell.
Speed had been around long enough to know he’d inherited a shambles of a squad and when Wales came knocking in December 2010, he didn’t take too long to answer.
Next up was Micky Adams who needed a good January 2011 ‘window’ to stave off the looming threat of relegation. His team lacked goals, with Evans still not firing and Bogdanovich looking increasingly disinterested. He also had a major problem in central defence with Bartley (willing but raw), Nosworthy (error prone) and Ertl (jumped lower than he stood) failing to plug the gap left by Morgan.
In came Doyle, Collins and Shane Lowry to shore things up, with Sam Vokes joining on loan in February. Vokes provided a modicum of hope but overall any improvement achieved was minimal and The Blades were effectively relegated by April 2011.
A staggering 29 signings (15 permanent and 14 loan) were made before and during the 2010-11 season. This was mismanagement on a grand scale with countless millions burnt on wages to incompetent players, loan fees, agent payments and paying off failing managers. This was the season, which epitomised everything The Blades’ had got wrong since relegation from The Premier League.
2011-12: Wilson and Winter
Relegation to the Third Division meant Adams was gone and in, amidst huge controversy, came Danny Wilson and his assistant Frank Barlow.
Another swathe of expensive failures left during the close season, including Henderson, Bogdanovich and Yeates. Jordan Slew was sold to Blackburn for £1m after only a handful of first team appearances (many supporters saw this as good business) and Jamie Ward left for an “undisclosed” fee to Derby.
Wilson’s first close season dealings look retrospectively positive. In came Kevin McDonald, Lescinel Jean-Francois, Ryan Flynn and Chris Porter. McDonald instantly looked too good for League One and LJF made a strong early impression, providing an attacking element from the left side of defence which had been lacking since Naughton’s departure.
Wilson’s January 2012 window was much less convincing with James Beattie’s return proving popular but ultimately ineffective and Marcus Williams - signed as left back cover after a half-decent loan spell - particularly disappointing.
Mark Howard was brought in to provide competition for Simonsen, who was proving much less of a liability behind a solid defence, which rendered him a spectator for much of the season.
Wilson’s loan signings were a mixed bag of quality. Billy Clarke and Matt Phillips arrived from Blackpool and added some much-needed attacking menace during the winter months. Phillips in particular looked an exciting prospect.
Less impressive were Hoskins, Egan, Hill and O’Halloran, though Hill was later ‘rewarded’ with a permanent deal.
Wilson had inherited a dysfunctional squad, which included a few good players, in the likes of Lowton, Quinn, Williamson and Maguire. His recruitment of McDonald and LJF, together with the rejuvenation of Evans turned things around and The Blades looked a shoe-in for promotion in 2012 until the unthinkable happened, Evans was gone and we failed to win any of our remaining three games.
2012-13: Wilson
The 2013 close season saw a major restructuring within the playing squad, with McCabe looking to reduce the club’s towering losses and adjust to the realities of an extended stay in the 3rd division.
Most of the biggest earners, including Williamson, Beattie, Quinn, Montgomery, Lowton and Ertl, were culled and Wilson had to search for cheaper replacements.
Seven players were signed during the summer including Shaun Miller, Dave Kitson and Nick Blackman who replaced some of the attacking verve lost with Evans’ departure. Tony McMahon also joined from Middlesboro and his signing was seen as something of a coup at the time – much less so by the time of his departure on loan to Blackpool, 18 months later.
To Wilson’s credit, he dealt with the disaster of missing promotion and loss of most of his key players from the 2011-12 season with some astute signings and an adjustment in playing style from ‘free-scoring’ to ‘hard to beat’. By Christmas 2012 The Blades were top of the league and looking well set to put right the disappointment of the previous campaign. Then catastrophe!
Blackman was sold on 30 January. His replacement, signed earlier in the month, was Jamie Murphy, who would eventually prove to be another excellent acquisition from Wilson’s watch, but despite showing glimpses of quality, he took a long time to adjust to the heightened demands of the English game.
Danny Higginbotham and Barry Robson - Wilson’s other January 2013 signings - rarely looked anything more than journeymen seeing out their time and the season’s early promise steadily faded.
Wilson’s sacking, with only 3 games to play and The Blades sitting comfortably in the play-off places, was nevertheless a shock to most supporters.
Caretaker boss Morgan failed to spark the hoped for response to drive The Blades up through the Play-offs and another season in the third tier was confirmed.
Wilson’s transfer market record looks pretty impressive with the benefit of hindsight and in the cost-saving context he was operating in during the second half of his tenure. In McDonald, Blackman and Murphy he signed 3 players who improved the team significantly and were subsequently sold on at a handsome profit.
2013-14: Weir (followed by Clough) and Winter (followed by Brannigan)
The Blades took a leap into the dark in appointing untested David Weir as their new manager in the summer of 2013.
With midfield lynchpin McDonald (sold to Wolves) amongst ten summer departures, Weir had some rebuilding to do and made 8 signings during the summer of 2013.
His emphasis was clearly on youth, with the likes of Jasper Johns, Febian Brandy, Sean McGinty, Jose Baxter, Florent Cuvelier, Steve McGinn and Lyle Taylor joining.
Despite some early promise, with his team struggling to score, Weir brought in Marlon King on a season-long deal just before the end of the September window. King’s previous off field ‘form’ made him another controversial signings, more so given the negative publicity surrounding Ched Evans.
Baxter was clearly talented but difficult to accommodate given his defensive limitations, whilst Cuvelier came highly rated but was inconsistent and sustained a cruciate injury in January 2014, which impeded his subsequent progress. King looked unfit and diminished, and none of Weir’s other permanent signings did much to inspire confidence that he understood the qualities required to get The Blades promoted from the 3rd division.
Weir did make one outstanding loan signing – that of Conor Coady from Liverpool, who grew in stature as the season progressed and would have been a hugely popular permanent signing.
By the time of his sacking after just 13 games, Weir had overseen the signing of 12 players. Nine of these (McGinty, Johns, McGinn, Taylor, Brandy, King, Bunn, Hall and Lappin) made a negligible contribution to improving the first team’s performance levels; Of the remainder: Baxter could be argued as having had a measure of on-field impact but his off-field ‘issues’ consign him to the status of a ‘bad signing’; the jury remains out on Cuvelier, and only Coady could be regarded as a success.
A legacy of misfits, has-beens and never has-beens is the not so hidden cost of getting it badly wrong in the appointment of a Manager. Weir’s successor was faced with the prospect of a relegation battle with a squad that was simply unfit for purpose.
Nigel Clough made an inauspicious start with his first signing as the new manager with Aiden White joining on loan from Leeds.
He really got down to business in the January 2014 window with the signings of Scougall and Harris on permanent deals along with Brayford, Paynter, Davies and Freeman on loan. Meanwhile, he moved King, McMahon, Barry and Williams out. A strong first ‘window’, many would argue.
Loanees, White and Paynter contributed minimally but Clough’s other signings helped propel The Blades to an FA Cup semi-final and from third bottom, when Clough joined, to the edge of the Play-offs.
2014-15: Clough and Brannigan
Clough’s reshaping began in earnest in the 2014 close season, with 11 players joining on permanent deals and an equal number leaving.
Arrivals included Campbell-Ryce, McNulty, Basham, Wallace J, Alcock, McGahey, Higdon and McEveley. He also offered a permanent deal to loanee Ben Davies and brought in centre half Andy Butler from Walsall.
Of the departures, all bar one were predictable and inconsequential to team performance.
Harry Maguire was sold on 29 July, 2014, for a reported £2.5m to Hull. His replacement, Andy Butler, made not a single league appearance for The Blades, appearing only in a few pre-season games and a League Cup tie against Mansfield before being shipped out on loan back to his former club.
The gap left by Maguire’s departure was threatening to derail The Blades’ promotion bid and Clough acted by bringing in Paddy McCarthy, on loan from Palace. He proved error prone and was eventually dropped. Meanwhile, Clough had fallen out with and marginalised Neill Collins, leaving him with only, youngsters, McGahey and Kennedy as recognised centre-halves.
Kennedy was injury prone and McGahey unready, so Clough, instead, relied on Basham – bought as a midfielder – and Brayford - his talismanic, marauding right-back - to fill in at centre half.
Clough’s January 2015 window could and should have been regarded as a “game-changer” given the arrival of Brayford, Done, Coutts, Adams, Wallace K, Freeman and Holt (on loan). With Butler, Ironside, McGinn and Porter moving out, very few would argue that these transactions were not representative of an improvement in personnel. Staggeringly, Clough undermined his other moves by failing to resolve the problem that was blighting his season – a replacement for Maguire!
Based on a review of the players inherited by Clough and those he subsequently signed and released, the suggestion that he weakened the squad and burdened his successor with “a load of dross” seems insubstantial.
Of his 19 permanent signings, an argument can be made for Basham, Adams and Brayford (under Clough) being successful, whilst most supporters would probably view Butler, Wallace J and Higdon as unsuccessful (Butler and Wallace based on injuries and circumstance rather than ability). For the remainder, the jury is either still out (e.g. McGahey) or it could be argued their impact has been neither disastrous nor outstanding.
Clough frequently underscored his perspective on signing players with a statement along the lines of, “we’ll only sign them if they are better than what we’ve got.” In general terms he probably did this. A strong case can be made that he strengthened the team that he inherited and replaced players he released or sold with others of a higher calibre – with the notable exception of Maguire. Obviously, the issue of cost becomes a factor here and on this point we are left to estimate due to the complications of “undisclosed” transfer payments, signing on fees, individual contracts etc.
It nevertheless seems reasonable to assume that Clough spent big and was still unable to achieve the increasingly elusive promotion back to The Championship.
Clough failed in three key areas of transfer policy:
1. His team became imbalanced and over-reliant on smaller, physically weaker midfield players (Scougall, Campbell-Ryce, Holt, Reed, Flynn) which allowed – often less technically proficient – opponents to bully his team into submission.
2. He needed to sign an effective, mobile striker (one who could play the lone role) in the summer of 2014 and signed Higdon instead. Whilst we can all acknowledge the difficulty in signing good strikers, surely he could have, at the very least, signed one with the mobility to work within his preferred system. Matt Done demonstrated this point, making an instant impact after signing in January.
3. He never resolved the loss of Maguire and thereby lost his team’s resilience and ability to soak up pressure and play on the break. In Clough’s second season The Blades were often chasing games and didn’t have the personnel or system to do this (Warnock had been a master in such situations because he ensured he had a variety of attacking options on the bench).
Despite his mistakes, Clough left a squad that had proved its ability to compete at the upper end of League One and was surely only a two or three astute additions short of being promotion ready.
2015-16: Adkins and ?
With relatively few players leaving in the summer of 2015 and a large current squad, new Manager Adkins had limited room for manoeuvre in his first transfer window. Only three permanent signings were made before the first game: Billy Sharp, Martyn Woolford and youngster, Jake Phillips., supplemented by loan signing Conor Sammon
Surprisingly, Adkins chose not to prioritise central defence, relying instead on Collins and McEveley to start the season. With Freeman and McFadzean filling the full back berths, this was a defence designed to concede goals, which it duly did – four of them at Gillingham. At this point, the penny dropped and David Edgar was signed on a season loan from Burnley.
The Gillingham game also proved to be the final game for Jamie Murphy, who was sold to Brighton shortly after. Murphy had been, consistently, one of The Blades’ few outstanding performers over the previous two seasons and his departure looked, on the face of it, like the next in line of season-defining departures, following on from Blackman and Maguire.
Adkins’ signings have, to date, been inconspicuous, with the notable exception of Billy Sharp who has played every game as though it was his last and tried valiantly to lead from the front.
Of the others, Hammond gives the team shape, balance and some physicality, but is often chasing the tails of younger, quicker opponents and at what cost? Edgar has started to impress of late and holds some promise. Woolford looks another in the long line fitting the description of “journeyman pro” to grace our hallowed turf in recent years. Sammon has been nothing short of an abject failure.
Hitherto, Adkins has followed the well, worn route of focusing mainly on players he knows from past clubs and believes he can rely on to deliver to a consistently high standard. The weakness in this approach, given his recent experience of managing at a higher level, could be the cost of these acquisitions and their readiness and desire to scrap their way out of the 3rd division.
Conclusions
Following relegation in 2007, The Blades have signed over 90 players on permanent deals and a further 60 on loan, at considerable expense. Many others have left – some for millions of pounds. The net effect of these comings and goings has been a failure to achieve the objective of returning to the Premier League, indeed a further relegation was suffered in 2011. So what went wrong?
Signing football players is not an exact science. Sometimes good players will underperform for a variety of reasons – often but not always attributable to managers and systems, e.g. Britton under Blackwell. On other occasions players will over perform, based on their previous record, - often due to managers and systems, e.g. Agana under Bassett and beside Deane.
Good managers surely start with a clear plan of how they want to play and sign players who fit with that plan, within the constraints of a budget. The tighter the budget, the harder a manager has to work and many have to work with the reality of selling their best players in order to stay afloat.
Bassett and Warnock had a clear, uncomplicated way of playing and recruited players to suit. Players who’d generally been plying their trade at a lower level or fallen out of favour at their previous club and had a point to prove
Blackwell, by contrast, seemed to apply a scattergun approach to signing players, some of whom did not fit with his preferred, direct style of play. Consequently, his signing of players such as James Harper and Leon Britton who liked to ‘get the ball down and play’ was destined to fail.
Robson was brought in to attract better quality players and ensure a swift return to the Premier League. He got the first part right, attracting the likes of Beattie, Speed and Naysmith, but was unable to translate top players into winning performances (perhaps another example of the inherent problem of catching players on their way down?).
Armed with what looked like a modest Premier League budget, Warnock made some astute signings and was ridiculously close to achieving his sole mission of staying up.
Having missed out on promotion in appalling circumstances in 2011 and having to deal with a reduced budget, Wilson re-gathered his troops and looked set to go close again in 2012 prior to losing his top scorer and assister, Blackman, in the January transfer window.
Which leads us onto the impact of signing or losing one key player.
In the summer of 2010, Paddy Kenny’s trigger clause and ultimate betrayal left us reliant on the talents of Steve Simonsen between the sticks. A weak keeper means a nervy defence and this was a season in which The Blades’ defence was always on the back foot. Once Morgs was lost to the cause the die was cast for what looked and felt like a relegation season.
In much the same way, 2012 felt like a promotion season until Evans’ incarceration scuttled The Blades with the finishing line in sight.
Most controversially, James Beattie was sold to Stoke City in the January 2009 ‘window’ and his goals played a huge part in preserving their Premier League status, which remains to this day. Whilst The Blades’ league position actually improved after Beattie’s departure, it is difficult to argue cause and effect in this instance and completely foolhardy to believe we would not have been better served at Wembley with James leading the line rather than his namesake Craig.
There seems plenty of evidence to suggest that one great signing or ill-timed departure can have a seismic impact on a team’s performance and fortunes.
Kevin McCabe’s point about managers being given “too much money”, sometimes being a problem in itself, is worth pondering. Would Clough have signed as many similar type players given a smaller budget? Would Wilson have signed Murphy had he been armed with a bigger budget at the time? Would Adkins have been forced to trawl for the best youngsters of the lower leagues rather than older players on Premier League and Championship wages if he’d been further constrained? Was Warnock really effective when spending into the millions on a single player?
Based on our success stories there is certainly no guarantee that size of transfer fee necessarily equates to getting it right in the transfer market. Indeed, two of The Blades’ club record – and arguably worst - signings were Chris Guthrie (£100k) in the seventies and Claude Davis (£3m) signed by Warnock.
Transfer fees paid for our successes over the past ten years are estimated as follows:
FREE: Ehiogu, LJF, McDonald and Basham
£0 up to £250k: Kazim-Richards, Blackman, Speed, Murphy and Adams
£250k-£500k: Ward, Williamson and Sharp (3rd time)
£500k-£1m: Stead
£1m+: Hulse, Kilgallon and Beattie
Using the generous assessment of sixteen successful, permanent signings over the past ten years: four were brought in on free transfers with a further five costing £250k or less. Of these McDonald, Kazim-Richards, Blackman and Murphy were sold on at a substantial profit (we can probably assume Adams will follow suit unless promotion is achieved this season or next).
A further four players cost between £250k-£1m, of whom just Jamie Ward is assumed to have been sold on for a profit, and three cost £1m+ - all of them being moved on at a substantial loss.
In Sheffield United’s terms, a transfer fee in excess of £1m can be regarded as ‘spending big’. By my reckoning The Blades have breached this threshold on nine occasions, when buying: Davis, Hulse, KIlgallon, Shelton, Beattie, Naysmith, Henderson, Evans and Brayford. Three of these have made it into our ‘success” list, which, in percentage terms, is better than the overall rate – though it wouldn’t seem unreasonable to expect a greater success rate when spending into the millions.
Of the £1m+ signings, none were sold on at a profit – even the ones adjudged to have been successful (injury was clearly a factor in Rob Hulse’s sell-on value and Kilgallon left on a Bosman).
Indeed, in ‘value for money’ terms, it would appear that The Blades have been far more successful when scouring for bargains. Twelve of the sixteen players, adjudged as “successful” signings, were either signed on a FREE or cost no more than £500k.
Another noteworthy point is that three of the four on our success list, who cost upwards of £500k, were strikers.
The age of our “successful” players at the time of signing ranges from 18 (Che Adams) to 38 (Gary Speed). Closer scrutiny reveals that ten of sixteen were aged 25 or under.
Just five players, from our success list were sold on at a profit. All were aged 23 or under at the time of signing for The Blades (Matt Kilgallon would probably have been added to that list had he not left on a Bosman at the end of his contract). Three of the five (Blackman, Murphy and McDonald) were signed for modest fees during Danny Wilson’s reign.
Another point worthy of consideration, is that over our ten year assessment period, from the 2006-07 season to present, twelve players have risen through The Blades Academy, who could reasonably be regarded as “successful.” These are:
Kyle Walker: 2 appearances, sold for £3m
Kyle Naughton: 40 appearances, sold for £6m
Phil Jagielka: 257 appearances, sold for £4m
Nick Montgomery: 351 appearances
Harry Maguire: 134 appearances, sold for £2.5m
Stephen Quinn: 206 appearances, sold for £100k
Michael Tonge: 262 appearances, sold for £2m
Jordan Slew: 11 appearances, sold for £1.1m
Louis Reed: 54 appearances, current first team squad
George Long: 107 appearances, current first team squad
Billy Sharp: 2 appearances, sold for £100k (then re-signed, sold and re-signed)
That’s 1426 appearances at an average of 118 first team appearances per player, which increases to 157 if we take out Walker, Slew and Sharp who were sold after making 15 just appearances between them.
Transfer receipts from the Academy players, amounts to approximately £18.6m. To put this in perspective, this is only 7% less than £19.9m estimated as the transfer receipts from all non-Academy players over the same, ten year, period.
Estimated transfer spend during the same period is just over £28m. This constitutes a n estimated loss on transfer activity of around £8m, before taking agents fees and other add-ons into account. If the cost of running the Academy has cost, as rumoured, around £1m per annum over the past 10 years, this would suggest a profit of around £8m on Academy transactions. This is before we take the relative wages of Academy versus non-Academy players into account, which we would expect to be significantly lower.
Add in the average number of appearances achieved by our list of successful Academy players (118) versus those on our “successful” list of non-Academy players (53) and the value of The Blades’ development programme becomes ever clearer.
In summary, the past 10 years of transfer activity, borne at considerable expense, has failed to deliver the expected improvement in team performance.
The most successful signings (based on appearances, impact and sell-on value) have been younger players signed from smaller or lower league clubs (Kazim-Richards, Ward, Murphy and Adams (est. value)) or who were out of favour at their previous club (McDonald and Blackman). Interestingly, all of the above bar maybe McDonald – who certainly wasn’t slow - could be described as “quick.”
Older players such as Speed and Ehiogu have shown that age is no barrier to making a positive impact, albeit for a limited period.
Spending larger amounts can improve the likelihood of success, as Beattie, Hulse and Kilgallon demonstrated, but it is certainly no guarantee, as experienced with Davis, Shelton and Henderson.
Having a ‘manager with a plan’ in place is a pre-requisite for success in the transfer market. This means identifying a preferred style of play and recruiting players to suit, as was generally the case with Bassett and Warnock but much less so with Blackwell.
As our analysis of Academy player shows, an effective player development programme can offer outstanding, relative value for money by comparison with recruiting via the transfer market.
Recruiting the right players, whether at Academy or senior level is, of course, but one element of a successful football club. It is, however, a very important one.
